Research Themes with selected publications in each area:

Dual Evolutionary Foundations of Political Ideology

cooperation and Voluntary Contributions to a Public Good:

  • Chaudhuri, A. (2018). Heterogeneous beliefs and the re-start effect in a public goods game. Games (Special Issue: Social Norms and Games), 2018, 9(4);
  • Chaudhuri, A. and Paichayontvijit, T. (2017). On the long-run efficacy of punishments and recommendations in a laboratory public goods game. Nature Scientific Reports, 7: 12286. September 2017. On-line article available here (open access).
  • Chaudhuri, A., Paichayontvijit, T. and Smith A. (2017). Belief heterogeneity and contributions decay among conditional cooperators in public goods games. Journal of Economic Psychology, 58, February 2017, 15-30.
  • “Sustaining Cooperation in Laboratory Public Goods Games: a Selective Survey of the Literature”, Experimental Economics, 14 (1), March 2011, 47-83. [Download PDF]
  • “Recommended Play and Costly Punishments in a Laboratory Public Goods Experiment”, (with Tirnud Paichayontvijit, University of Auckland), forthcoming in Krishnendu Ghosh Dastidar, Hiranya Mukhopadhyay and Uday Bhanu Sinha (Eds.), Dimensions of Economic Theory and Policy: Essays for Anjan Mukherji, New Delhi: Oxford University Press. [Download PDF]
  • “Social Learning and Norms in an Experimental Public Goods Game with Inter-Generational Advice” (with Sara Graziano, Charles River Associates and Pushkar Maitra, Monash University), Review of Economic Studies, April 2006, 73(2), 357-380.[Download PDF]
  • “Conditional Cooperation and Voluntary Contributions to a Public Good” (with Tirnud Paichayontvijit, University of Auckland), Economics Bulletin, April 2006, 3(8), p. 1-15. [Download PDF]

Trust, Reciprocity and Social Capital:

  • “Gender Differences in Trust and Reciprocity in Repeated Gift Exchange Games” (with Erwann Sbai, University of Auckland), New Zealand Economic Papers: Special Issue in Economic Psychology and Behavioural Economics, Volume 45, Issues 1-2, April-August 2011, 81-95. [Download PDF]
  • “An Experimental Analysis of Trust and Trustworthiness” (with Lata Gangadharan, University of Melbourne), Southern Economic Journal, April 2007, 73(4), 959-985. [Download PDF]
  • “On the Efficacy of Implicit Contracts: The Role of Reciprocity in Contract Enforcement” (with Amy Cruickshank, New Zealand Treasury), Working Paper, Department of Economics, University of Auckland, November 2006. [Download PDF]
  • “Trust and Trustworthiness in a Sequential Bargaining Game”, (with Sarah Khan, Aishwarya Lakshmiratan, Anne-Laure Py and Lisa Shah, all Wellesley College), Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 16(5), December 2003, p. 331-340.[Download PDF]
  • “Cooperation in Social Dilemmas, Trust and Reciprocity”, (with Barry Sopher, Rutgers University and Paul Strand, Washington State University), Journal of Economic Psychology, Volume 23(2), March 2002, p. 231 – 249. [Download PDF].

Coordination problems:

  • “Rcommended Play and and Performance Bonuses in the Minimum Effort Coordination Game” (with Tirnud Paichayontvijit, University of Auckland), Experimental Economicss, Volume 13, Issue 3 September 2010, 346-363. [Download PDF]
  • “Talking Ourselves to Efficiency: Coordination Conventions in an Inter-Generational Minimum Effort Game with Private, Almost Common and Common Knowledge of Advice”, (with Andrew Schotter, New York University and Barry Sopher, Rutgers University)Economic Journal, Volume 119, p. 91-122. [Download PDF]
  • “Common and Almost Common Knowledge of Credible Assignments in a Coordination Game, (with Laura Bangun, Parapin Prak and Chenan Zhou, all University of Auckland), Economics Bulletin, January 2006, 3(1), p. 1-10. [Download PDF]


  • The role of framing, inequity and history in a corruption game: Some experimental evidence, Games 7(2), 12, 2016.
  • “Do Attitudes Towards Corruption Differ Across Cultures? Experimental Evidence from Australia, India, Indonesia and Singapore” (with Lata Gangadharan, Nisvan Erkal, Lisa Cameron, all at the University of Melbourne), Journal of Public Economics,93(7-8), August 2009, 843-851. [Download PDF]
  • “Gender and Corruption: Insights from an Experimental Analysis” (with Vivi Alatas, World Bank, Indonesia, Lisa Cameron, Nisvan Erkal and Lata Gangadharan, all at the University of Melbourne), Southern Economic Journal, Volume 75, Number 3, January 2009, 663-680. [Download PDF]
  • “A Corruption Experiment with Indonesian Public Servants and Indonesian Students” (with Vivi Alatas, World Bank, Indonesia, Lisa Cameron, Nisvan Erkal and Lata Gangadharan, all at the University of Melbourne), Experimental Economics, 12(1), March 2009, 113-132. [Download PDF]

contracting under asymmetric information:

  • “The Ratchet Principle in a Principal Agent Game with Unknown Costs: An Experimental Analysis”, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Volume 37(3), November 1998, p. 291-304. [Download PDF]
  • “Information Structure and Contractual Choice in Franchising”, (with Debajyoti Chakrabarty, Rutgers University and Chester Spell, Washington State University), Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 58 (4), December 2002, p. 638-663.[Download PDF]
  • “On the Choice of Tenancy Contracts in Rural India”, (with Pushkar Maitra, Monash University), Economica, Vol. 69, Issue 275, August 2002, p. 445-459. [Download PDF]
  • “Tenant Characteristics and the Choice of Tenurial Contracts in Rural India” (with Pushkar Maitra, Monash University), Journal of International Development, Vol. 13 (2), March 2001, p. 169-181. [Download PDF]
  • “Formal and Informal Sector Credit Institutions and Interlinkage”, (with Debajyoti Chakrabarty, Rutgers University), Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 46 (3), November 2001, p. 312-325.[Download PDF]
  • “Sharecropping Contracts in Rural India: A Note”, (with Pushkar Maitra, Monash University) Journal of Contemporary Asia, Volume 30(1), February 2000, p. 99-107.[Download PDF]